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Supply Shock versus
Demand Shock
The Local Efects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas
Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast, and Davin Reed
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Policymakers worry that
new market-rate apartment
buildings in gentrifying
neighborhoods could raise
nearby rents and accelerate
gentrification.
n New buildings could
change nearby amenities or
neighborhood reputation,
increasing demand for the
neighborhood enough to offset
the effect of increasing supply.
n We test this hypothesis
and find that new marketrate apartment buildings in
low-income central city areas
instead slow rent increases.
n New market-rate
apartment buildings also
increase the number of people
migrating from other lowincome neighborhoods to the
nearby area.
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Public frustration over escalating housing
costs has steadily risen, particularly in large
urban centers, as rents eat up an ever-larger
portion of take-home pay. A commonly suggested
solution is to allow developers to build more
market-rate housing, which should lower rents
by increasing supply. Previous research suggests
that this will indeed reduce housing costs on
average, but many think that this overall beneft
comes with a signifcant cost—new development
could raise rents in the immediately surrounding
neighborhood.
Tis runs counter to standard economic
models of supply and demand, but a slightly more
complicated story could generate this result. Te
story is particularly plausible in low-income or
gentrifying neighborhoods. Because new units
are typically expensive, they are usually flled by
high-income households. Tese households could
attract new stores, restaurants, or other amenities,
and they could also signal that a neighborhood is
changing in a way that is attractive to other highincome households. If these amenity or reputation
changes are large, they could increase demand for
the neighborhood by enough to completely ofset
the increase in supply, causing rents to increase and
accelerating gentrifcation.
Tis story has substantial infuence in the policy
debate, leading many policymakers and residents
to strongly oppose new market-rate housing
developments in low-income areas. However, there
is currently very little evidence for or against the
idea. Our recent working paper flls the gap in
knowledge by testing this theory directly.
We fnd that new market-rate apartment
buildings in low-income areas do not accelerate
gentrifcation. Instead, they slow rent increases
in nearby apartments and increase the number
of people who move into the area from other

low-income neighborhoods. Tus, the efect of
new supply appears to outweigh any amenity
or reputation improvements. Te latter may be
small because new housing, even in currently
low-income areas, goes into areas that are already
gentrifying. Tis implies that new developments
serve mainly to absorb existing demand for an area

We fnd that new apartment
buildings in low-income areas
do not accelerate gentrifcation.
Instead, they slow rent increases in
nearby apartments and increase
migration from other low-income
neighborhoods.
rather than to generate new demand. In turn, this
reduces pressures on nearby rents because many
high-income households move to the new building
rather than outbidding lower-income households
for nearby apartments.
Where Are New Apartment
Buildings Constructed?
We start with the most basic question: Where
do developers build new market-rate apartments?
We focus on a setting where the afordability crisis
is worst, the housing debate is most contentious,
and the amenities story is most plausible: large
(50+) unit apartment buildings constructed in
low-income, central city neighborhoods of major
market cities between 2010 and 2019. Tese cities
are Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago,
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Table 1 Building Neighborhood Characteristics

Household income
2000 ($)
2010 ($)
2017 ($)
2000–2010 (%)
2010–2017 (%)
College degree (%)
2000
2010
2017
Number of tracts

No building

Some building

47,190
45,097
47,129
−4.4
4.5

44,998
48,181
63,771
7.1
32.4

18
23
27
2,459

33
44
55
1,094

NOTE: Means of the characteristics of the neighborhoods (census tracts) which received new buildings or not.
“Some building” column means are weighted by the number of buildings in each neighborhood. Samples
of buildings and neighborhoods are described in detail in the working paper: https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/316/.
SOURCE: Real Capital Analytics, Census 2000 Long Form (“2000”), American Community Survey 2006–2010 5-Year
Estimates (“2010”), and American Community Survey 2013–2017 5-Year Estimates (“2017”).

Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,
Portland, San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C.
Table 1 compares low-income
neighborhoods (defned as a census
tract with median household income
below the metropolitan area median)
that received a new building to those
that did not.1 Two striking patterns
emerge. First, while 2010 household
income is similar across the two
groups, the areas that received a new
building saw much larger increases in
income during both the 2000–2010
and 2010–2017 time period. Second,
areas receiving construction had
substantially higher levels of college
education, which is ofen considered
a leading indicator of gentrifcation.
Tese patterns suggest that developers
tend to target areas that are already
changing, rather than attempting to
kickstart gentrifcation in previously
stable neighborhoods.
In short, new developments are
correlated with gentrifcation, but they
follow it rather than precede it. Tis is
likely because relatively high rents are
necessary to make new construction
feasible, so developers do not build in
areas where they cannot charge those

2

rents. Note that these patterns are
specifc to large apartment buildings
but may be diferent for other types of
construction.
How Do New Buildings Afect
Nearby Rents?
We then use data on individual rent
listings provided by Zillow to assess the
central question in the policy debate:
Do new buildings in low-income areas
increase rents? We focus on buildings
built between 2015 and 2016 in order
to be able to observe at least three years
of data before and afer construction.
Te major challenge to estimating
causal efects is that new buildings
are not randomly placed. Developers
target areas where rent is rising fast
and is expected to continue to rise in
the future. Because of this, a simple
comparison of rents in areas that did
and did not get new construction
(similar to our income comparison
in Table 1) would likely show that
rents increased by more near new
buildings. However, this diference
would not necessarily be caused by
the new building. We use two quasiexperiments to overcome this problem.

First, we compare a treatment
group very close to the new building
(within 250 meters) to a control
group slightly further away (between
250 and 600 meters). Te idea is that
while developers might well target a
specifc neighborhood, they cannot
choose exactly when and where to
build because not every parcel is for
sale or able to be developed. Tis
means that within a small area, the
exact placement of a new building
is relatively random, making our
treatment and control group close to
identical except that the treatment
group is closer to the new building.
Tis strategy is good for picking up
very local efects of new buildings,
like new retail options or the aesthetic
improvement of replacing a vacant lot.
However, new buildings might have
broader amenity or reputation efects
that extend beyond that geographically
small treatment and control group.
To account for these, we construct a
second “experiment.” We compare rents
near sites developed in 2015–2016
(our treatment group) to those near
sites that were developed in 2019 (our
control group). Te idea is that these
two groups of sites are both appealing
to developers but were not developed
at the same time due to random delays
in the land acquisition, fnancing, city
approval, or construction processes.
Because our treatment buildings are
no longer in the same neighborhood
as control buildings, we can detect
changes in rents that are caused by
efects that span a larger geography.
Both approaches suggest that new
buildings decrease rents by 5 to 7
percent relative to what they otherwise
would be. In both cases, we fnd that
rents were following similar trends
in the treatment and control groups
before the buildings were completed,
but rent increases slow sharply in
the treatment areas immediately
afer the buildings’ completion. Tis
efect remains constant for the three
postconstruction years that we can
observe before our sample ends, and,
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Do New Buildings Afect Who Moves
into the Surrounding Neighborhood?
Last, we study how a new
development changes in-migration
to the surrounding neighborhood
(excluding the new building itself). We
do so using address history data from
Infutor Data Solutions, a marketing
intelligence company. Te data do not
include information on individuals’
incomes, so we instead construct
outcomes using the average income in
migrants’ origin neighborhoods.
Figure 1 shows trends in the
number of high-income arrivals within
250 meters of buildings completed
in 2014 or 2015 in a low-income
neighborhood.2 We defne high-income
movers as those who moved from a
neighborhood with income above
the metropolitan median. As shown
in the black line, the total number of
high-income arrivals does increase by
about 20 percent following a building’s
completion. However, this increase
is entirely driven by arrivals to the
new building itself (the red line). Te
blue line, which shows the number of
arrivals to the area within 250 meters
excluding the new building, remains fat
or declines slightly afer construction.
While this suggests that a new
building does not drastically change
in-migration to a neighborhood, it does
not provide causal evidence on the
building’s efect. In our fnal exercise,

we repeat the quasi-experiments that
we used to study rent but instead use
the origin neighborhood income of
in-migrants as the outcome. We fnd
that new buildings increase the number
of arrivals from neighborhoods with
average income below two-thirds
of the metropolitan area median by
three percentage points and reduce
average origin income by a similar
amount. Te increase in low-income
arrivals implies that new buildings
also decrease rents for relatively cheap
units, not just the expensive units that
are their most direct competitors. More
directly, the new buildings appear to
allow more low-income households to
move to these frequently gentrifying
neighborhoods.
Policy Implications
Te housing approval process in
low-income and gentrifying areas is
contentious, ofen because of concerns
that new buildings will accelerate rent

increases and neighborhood change.
Our evidence suggests that this is
typically not the case. Instead, new
buildings slow nearby rent increases
and increase the ability of individuals
from low-income neighborhoods
to move to the nearby area. While
the neighborhoods containing new
buildings do gain richer residents,
the gain is concentrated in the new
building. Tis efectively diverts highincome individuals from outbidding
low-income individuals for units in the
nearby preexisting buildings. Te new
housing thus helps absorb the pressure
from the increasing number of highincome individuals that want to live in
central city neighborhoods. Moreover,
by allowing more low-income
households to move to an area, new
housing helps these rapidly changing
neighborhoods remain economically
integrated, which research suggests
promotes economic mobility for lowincome residents.

Figure 1 In-Migration to Areas around New Buildings
60
50
40
Arrivals

in a separate estimation, we fnd no
evidence that efects change when we
focus on earlier buildings and observe
fve years afer completion.
We note that this efect is relative to
what rents would be had the building
not been constructed—our fnding
does not mean that rents decreased in
absolute terms. Because our treatment
areas are the places most likely to
experience the positive amenity and
reputation efects that could cause
rents to increase, we take this as strong
evidence that new buildings in lowincome areas decrease rather than
increase rents.
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NOTE: This fgure shows trends in the number of in-migrants from tracts with income above the MSA-median to
the area within 250 meters of new buildings. Nonbuilding migrants are those arriving to the area within 250
meters but not the new building, building migrants are arrivals to the new building itself, and total migrants is
the sum. The sample includes 2011–2017 moves within 250 meters of new buildings completed in 2014–2015.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using data from Infutor Data Solutions and the U.S. Census Bureau.
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On the whole, new market-rate
housing appears to beneft not just the
region but also the local neighborhood.
Tis suggests that market-rate housing
should be an important part of any
solution to the housing afordability
crisis. Fears of increased rents near
new buildings should not prevent
governments from implementing
desired reforms to regional housing
supply.
We note two important caveats
to our fndings. First, we estimate
an average efect that may disguise
variation across diferent types
of buildings and neighborhoods.
Amenity and reputation efects are
highly subjective and may vary widely
depending on the local context.
Second, the buildings in our sample are
in the types of places that developers
historically have wanted to build.
While these areas are central to the
debate, the efects may be diferent
in other types of neighborhoods.
For example, developers rarely build
market-rate units in very low-income
areas with high vacancy rates, so our
results do not speak to what would
happen if they did.
Notes
1. A census tract is an area with about
4,000 people.
2. Our migration data contain one less
year than our rent data, so we shif the
buildings we study back by one year.

This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/.
Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at
the Upjohn Institute. David Reed is a community
development economic advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Efects of
Unemployment Insurance
Reforms in Brazil
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso
Te Brazilian unemployment
insurance (UI) program was
established in response to a severe
economic recession in the 1980s. It
is now the largest UI program in the
Latin America and Caribbean region,
with more than 40 million benefciaries
between 2012 and 2016. Despite its
size, the program operates in a labor
market where more than one-third of
all employees work in informal jobs
not covered by UI. Because these latter
workers receive no benefts when they
are separated from their jobs, formal
sector employment is desirable, and
previous research has found signifcant
fows of workers between the formal
and informal sectors and back again,
which UI receipt may facilitate. In
particular, some employers may use UI
to subsidize wages of workers they lay
of and then recall afer UI benefts end.
Some laid-of employees even continue
to work informally in their prior
jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van
Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins
2017). Moreover, the UI program has
historically been generous in terms
of minimal eligibility requirements
within the formal sector, which could
further incentivize such back-andforth fows.
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI
program relatively expensive, and when

a recession in 2014 further increased
costs, the Brazilian government
instituted reforms in the eligibility rules
to contain future costs. We investigate
the efects of two such changes in UI
eligibility rules in 2015 that increased
the work experience requirements for
frst- and second-time UI applicants.
While previous research estimated that
these reforms signifcantly reduced
layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita
2018), our analysis, which relies on
more complete administrative records,
fnds smaller overall reductions in
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases
for workers with a single prior UI
beneft spell.
A Natural Experiment
Te recession that began in early
2014, coupled with the institutional
features of Brazil’s UI program
described above, led to calls for
reforming the system. Facing general
budget difculties and anticipating
a signifcant rise in unemployment,
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef
issued Provisional Measure 665 in late
December of 2014, raising UI eligibility
requirements for frst and second
time UI claimants, efective March 1,
2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature
passed a new law codifying eligibility

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now
the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and
second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than
for first-time claimants.
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rules nearly as strict as the provisional
measure, and this law took efect on
June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced
two sudden changes in UI eligibility
rules in 2015, although these changes
applied only for workers on their frst
or second UI application; rules for the
third and subsequent applications were
unchanged. Consequently, the reforms
were targeted toward recent labor
market entrants.
Specifcally, the reforms increased
the minimum number of months of
employment workers needed before
they would qualify for the shortest
beneft duration on their frst or
second UI application. Prior to the
frst reform, any UI applicant who had
worked six months in the prior three
years could qualify for three months of
benefts (frst row of Table 1). Under
both reforms, frst- and second-time
UI applicants now needed longer
recent work experience to qualify for
the shortest potential beneft duration.
For frst-time claimants, for example,
the new minimum potential beneft
shifed from three to four months, but
the required work period increased
from 12 to 18 months under the frst
reform, before returning to 12 months
under the second reform, a mere four
months later. A summary of the work
requirements for UI beneft eligibility
under each set of eligibility rules is
listed in the Table 1.
Our evaluation focuses on shorttenure workers who were most afected
by the changes in UI eligibility rules.
Using data that contains tenure at the
daily level, we contrast job layof rates
for a treatment group of workers with
at least 6 and less than 7 months of
job tenure against a control group of
workers with at least 5 and less than 6
months of job tenure. Under the initial
regime, the treatment group with 6
months of job tenure was eligible for
three months of UI benefts but frstand second-time applicants became
ineligible for any benefts under both
reforms. We estimate how diferences
in layof risk between the treatment

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE

and control groups vary across the
diferent regimes, an approach called
diference-in-diferences. To isolate
the impact of the reforms, we further
adjust for diferences across individuals
in their geographic location, calendar
month in the data, and demographic
characteristics.
Efects on Layofs
We fnd that the increase in work
months needed for UI eligibility
reduced employer layofs. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI
applications, the frst reform reduced
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points
(from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent).
Te impact of the second reform
was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41
percentage points relative to the period
before either reform.
Among workers who had one prior
UI application, the reforms had even
stronger impacts, with the frst reform
reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage
points (from a base layof rate of 4.0
percent), and the second reform by
1.05 percentage points.
While sizable, these efects are
smaller than those implied by earlier
studies that did not have as detailed
data on the number of prior UI
applications. When we approximate the
methodology of previous studies by not

accounting for the number of prior UI
spells, we estimate a layof reduction
from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage
points, much smaller than earlier

Program costs rose sharply with the
recession starting in 2014 as more
unemployed workers with sufcient
experience drew UI benefts.
estimates of 0.53 percentage points
(Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi,
and Narita 2018).
Reduction in Collusion
In the United States, UI benefts are
fnanced by experience-rated employer
taxes that rise with total benefts paid
to an employer’s former workers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, layofs are
lower in states where UI taxes rise more
quickly with experience-rating (Card
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian
UI benefts are fnanced from general
revenues, and neither employers nor
workers pay specifc taxes to fnance
the program. Consistent with this lack
of implicit penalty for heavily using the
system, Brazilian UI benefts appear to
subsidize the fow between low-wage,
short-term jobs and informal sector

Table 1 Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017
Number of
UI claim
First

Second

Third or more

Potential
beneft duration

Initial regime
(1990 to Feb. 27,
2015)

Reform 1
(Feb. 28, 2015 to
June 16, 2015)

Reform 2
(from June 17, 2015)

Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five
Three
Four
Five

6
12
24
6
12
24
6
12
24

—
18
24
—
12
24
6
12
24

—
12
24
9
12
24
6
12
24

NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134.
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Figure 1 Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs
Zero prior claims

Impact on probability of layoﬀs

0
−0.2

One prior claim

−0.18

−0.4

−0.40

−0.6
−0.8
Reform 1

−1

−0.90

Reform 2

−1.05

−1.2
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

jobs, in some cases back and forth
with the same employer (Doornik,
Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017).
We fnd the eligibility reforms
afected this behavior, too. For shorttenure workers with no prior UI claims,
the probability of being rehired by the
same employer within 4 to 10 months
of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points
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points afer the second reform. For
short-tenure workers with one prior UI

claim, the frst reform reduced recall to
the same employer by 1.7 percentage
points, an amount similar to workers
with no prior UI claims. However, the
second reform did not appear to afect
recalls for these workers.
Conclusion
We confrm results of previous
research that Brazil’s 2015 increases
in UI eligibility requirements reduced
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New and Recent Books from Upjohn Press
Pathways to Careers
in Health Care
Christopher T. King and
Philip Young P. Hong, Editors
In 2009, at the time when Congress passed the
Afordable Care Act (ACA), the Bureau of Labor
Statistics projected that over the next 10 years,
the health care and
social assistance
sector would gain
5.6 million jobs,
outpacing all other
occupation groups.
This job growth
corresponds to our
increasing demand
for health care
resulting mainly
from our aging population. To help meet this
growing demand for workers, Congress included
in the ACA Health Professions Opportunity
Grants (HPOG), a demonstration program
within the Department of Health and Human
Services established to provide health care career
opportunities for disadvantaged populations.

Making Sense
of Incentives

Taming Business Incentives
to Promote Prosperity
Timothy J. Bartik
“With this book, Tim Bartik has solidifed his
rank as the leading, trusted expert on economic
development
incentives
and economic
development broadly.
The role of frmbased incentives has
triggered passionate
debate, and Bartik
responds with rigor,
reason, and realism.
I hope readers heed
the call for needed reforms recommended in
this timely book.”—Amy Liu, vice president and
director, Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program

This book presents a wide-ranging look at HPOG
and innovative support programs which are both
aimed at not only facilitating career pathways to
the health care feld for low-income individuals,
but also helping to meet the growing demand for
health care workers.

“Economic development incentives are one of
the biggest boondoggles of our time, draining
away tens of billions of dollars of precious
taxpayer dollars, with some states and cities
ofering as much as $7 billion to lure Amazon’s
much-ballyhooed HQ2. No one understands
the intricacies of economic development
incentives—what works and what does not—
and the broader feld of economic development
policy and strategy better than Tim Bartik.
This book is an absolute must read for mayors,
governors, economic developers, city-builders,
CEOs and business executives, community
activists, and all those concerned about the future
of our cities and communities.”—Richard Florida,
author of The Rise of the Creative Class, and
University Professor at the University of Toronto

December 2019. 408 pp.
$35 paper 978-0-88099-666-2

October 2019. 178 pp.
$14.99 pbk ISBN 978-0-88099-668-6

Download the frst chapter for free at https://
research.upjohn.org/up_press/259/.

PDF is free at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_press/258/.

As the editors point out, “HPOG unites two
important innovations in workforce development
programming for serving low-income populations
in recent decades, career pathways and sector
strategies, by actively fostering the use of the
former in the context of one major sector—
health care.”

WE
focus
series

Strengths of the
Social Safety Net in
the Great Recession
Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance and
Unemployment Insurance

Christopher J. O’Leary, David Stevens, Stephen A.
Wandner, and Michael Wiseman, Editors
The impacts of the Great Recession greatly
tested the nation’s social safety net. During
this monumental
economic downturn,
the number of
Unemployment
Insurance (UI)
recipients doubled
from 10 million to
20 million, and the
number receiving
benefts through
the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) ballooned
from 20 million to 50 million. Many who lost
their jobs became eligible for UI and often SNAP,
too. Many already receiving SNAP lost jobs and
became eligible for UI. While both programs were
stressed, they proved to be fexible enough to
respond to the needs of many of the victims of the
recession. But little has been known about how
the two programs interacted and how policies
governing them may be altered to better respond
to hardship when future downturns occur.
This book shows that each program has
considerable efects on the other and how policies
governing them could be altered to better serve
recipients of both programs.
July 2019. 430 pp.
$30.00 pbk ISBN 978-0-88099-663-1
PDF is free at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_press/257/.
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